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Total Reward in the UK in the Public and Private Sectors
* 
 
Recent controversy has surrounded the relative value of public and private sector 
remuneration. We define a comprehensive measure of Total Reward (TR) which includes not 
just pay, but pensions and other ‘benefits in kind’, evaluate it as the present value of the sum 
of all these payments over the lifetime and compare it in the UK public and private sectors. 
Our results suggest that TR is equalized over the lifecycle for men while women have a clear 
TR advantage in the public sector by the end of their career. We suggest that the current 
controversy over public-private sector pension differentials and the perennial issues of 
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“The pension system is only an alternative to paying a higher salary to those rendering 
existing  services  and  leaving  them  subsequently  to  look  after  their  own  superannuation 
allowance.” 
 
Sir Josiah Stamp (1880-1941) “Wealth and Taxable Capacity.” 1922, Ch. II, p.57. 
 
 
“The true reward which an occupation offers to labour has to be calculated by deducting 
the money value of all its disadvantages from that of all its advantages; and we may describe this 
true reward as the net advantages of the occupation.” 
 
Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) “Principles of Economics.” 8




1.  Introduction 
Recent controversy has surrounded the relative value of public and private sector remuneration in 
the UK. In the current recession and fiscal debt crises, there has been huge pressure to cut public sector 
remuneration. Many countries have already done this in nominal terms (e.g. Greece and the Republic of 
Ireland) and most countries will be doing this in real terms over the next five years. At the same time 
there has been growing concern about the ageing population and the burden of the pension obligations to 
public sector workers in the future. As any manipulation of public sector compensation (in terms of pay 
or  pensions  or  other  conditions  of  service)  will  have  immediate  consequences  for  fiscal  budgets, 
workforce  composition,  delivery  of  services,  inequality  and  relative  remuneration  it  is  necessary  to 
carefully evaluate any proposed changes in any element of the total remuneration package. It is also 
important to be clear what this calculation tells us about public/private sector remuneration relativities as 
this is a perennial comparison fraught with pitfalls. 
There is almost universal agreement that any debate about remuneration should include pay and 
pensions and all other forms of benefits in kind. There is no agreement on how this should be calculated. 
Although there has been a lot of work on selected aspects of the value of pensions across sectors (e.g., 
Disney et al. 2009) there has been relatively little on the evaluation of broader concepts of compensation. 
Indeed—although  the  notion  of  ‘Total  Reward’  (TR)  seems  of  have  become  fashionable  in  Human 
Resource Management circles there is no consensus of specifically what TR includes and leaves out. 
Often (see Greenhill, 1990 and Balsam, 2002) ‘Total Remuneration’ or the ‘compensation package’ (for 3 
executives)  is  said  to  include:  salary,  bonus,  stock  options,  stock  grants,  pensions  and  other 
compensation.  This literature tends to exclude: hours of work, holiday entitlements, job security (in terms 
of the probability of being  made unemployed) and does not attempt to enumerate future benefits in 
present value terms or to adopt a life cycle perspective on this evaluation.  These would all seem to be 
important considerations for an economic evaluation of Total Reward.  
This paper provides a conceptual method for the measurement of Total Reward and proceeds to 
estimate the TR structure for the private and public sector in the UK. For the purposes of this paper we 
will define TR in a sector for an average career as the total financial benefits and in kind compensation, 
evaluated in money terms over the life cycle. This will include conditions of work like: working hours, 
paid holidays and unemployment risk as well as direct financial remuneration both now and deferred as 
pension payments in the future. We take into account current earnings, pensions, hours of work, paid 
holidays, employer provided health insurance, the likelihood of unemployment and the lifetime pattern of 
pension contributions. We do this by pooling the largest available sources of data on public and private 
sector employees and examining how they differ, on average, across the life cycle. This meant we used all 
of the following data in our analysis: the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA), and the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS). Each of these data sets provides different data on the various components of 
pensionable pay. We provide a Data Appendix to this paper which includes a list of all the available data 
which pertain to our evaluation of Total Reward. 
The first contribution of this paper is to estimate the level of total compensation of the highly 
educated in the private and public sectors in the UK. The average earnings profile in the public sector 
depicted in Figure 1 starts off at a higher entry level than in the private sector.
1 Later in the life cycle 
stronger wage growth means that the private sector earnings profile rises above the public profile. While 
both profiles level off at later ages, the private sector profile even declines below the public profile. This 
shape of the private and public sector profiles has led researchers to impose a quadratic functional form 
on age-earnings profiles (cp. Disney et al., 2009). When performing the analysis on employer-reported 
earnings (ASHE data), we consistently find inverted u-shaped median age-earnings profiles (Figure 1; 
                                                       
1 Of course, all calculations behind this figure are in real terms and net of the sector specific growth rate in the 
economy. 4 
the age-earnings profile using LFS data can be found as Figure A1
2 in the Appendix).
3 Basically, the 
question is whether initially low but steeper private sector earnings profiles produce the same Total 
Reward as public sector profiles which (on average) start off higher but progress at a slower growth rate? 
 
Figure 1: Age-earnings profiles using semiparamtric median quantile regression 
   
Note: Hourly wages are employer reported as actual earnings over actual working hours (including overtime). Real 
values deflated to 2009 before netting out average annual growth in each sector. Source: ASHE 1997 to 2009 
(ONS), own calculations. 
 
To answer this question we define the concept of Accumulated Lifetime Total Reward (ALTR). 
Besides earnings and pension accruals, we include four non-wage and non-pension components in the 
                                                       
2 Median earnings are substantially lower when using LFS rather than ASHE data. While the LFS is increasingly 
plagued by non-response from high-income earners (Bell, Elliot, Scott, Ada and Roberts, 2006) the ASHE does not 
sample employees who fall below the NI contribution threshold (low income earners). As we restrict our sample to 
higher educated individuals, we expect the first source of bias to be stronger than the second one. 
3 Two aspects of the age-earnings profiles deserve some closer attention. First, given the potentially larger variation 
of earnings in the private than in the public sector at each age, it would be useful to know whether the two profiles 
are really different from each other. In our standard analysis we reduce the problem of establishing comparability 
from two sample means (Belman and Heywood, 2004) by using median earnings. To detect whether the mean 
earnings  between  sectors  are  significantly  different  we  construct  95%  confidence  intervals.  While  earnings 
differences are insignificant at the beginning and end of the working career, private sector employees do have an 
earnings premium at mid age (Figures A2 and A3). Second, like the previous literature we use cross-sectional 
earnings data. We are aware of the fact that these profiles might potentially differ from true lifetime profiles for 
compositional reasons. Especially older workers who were made redundant and find it difficult to enter a new job 
(for reasonable pay) and  who face a relatively  short period until reaching the retirement age often enter early 
retirement (Chan and Stevens, 2001). Nevertheless, this approach mimics the perspective of the government which 

































Public sector: women5 
valuation of Total Reward.
4 So, the second contribution of this research is that we are the first to evaluate 
the contribution  made to Total  Reward  by:  Hours of  work,  paid  holidays,  employer-provided  health 
insurance and the probability of employment.
5 After accounting for imperfections of the labour market 
(the risk of unemployment), the intuition is that Total Reward in both sectors should be equal for very 
similar workers performing equal work. Therefore, in some sense, we perform this complex valuation 
exercise in order to provide a simple test of the theory of compensating differentials. The idea is a logical 
extension  of  the  Rosen  (1974)  ‘equalizing  differences’  framework  in  which  each  individual  would 
attempt to choose the sector which maximised their lifetime TR (or utility).
6 In such a framework it 
makes sense that the different alternative careers would end up have equal TR when calculated in present 
value terms over the whole lifecycle.  If this was not the case then individuals would all wish to work in 
the same sector which would of course necessitate a realignment of at least one element of TR to bring 
the economy back into equilibrium with appropriate amounts of people wishing to go into each sector. 
Our  third  contribution  concerns  the  valuation  of  pensions.  Unlike  the  earlier  literature  on  pension 
valuation that computes the value of prospective one-year accruals in defined benefit (DB) and define 
contribution (DC) schemes (e.g., Disney et al., 2009; Crawford et al., 2010), we account in greater detail 
for the complexities of the private and state components of the pension system in the public and private 
sectors. Specifically, we compute the level of total accruals at each age over the life cycle and compare a 
typical (‘average’) public sector employee (with more than 90 percent of DB coverage) with a private 
sector employee (with a mixture of DB, money purchase and state earnings-related pensions).  
This paper produces three empirical findings: First, we compute the value of non-monetary Total 
Reward components in the UK at around 15 to 20 percent of total earnings—a non-negligible fraction. 
Second, we find that the level of Total Reward differs substantially across the public and private sector 
for most of the life cycle. The fact that total compensation is so different even after accounting for 
                                                       
4 Evidence from the USA suggests that in-kind benefits are more common (Heywood, 1991) and more generous 
(Quinn, 1982) in the public sector. 
5 Initially, we also included employer-provided training days. Due to potential double counting and the difficulties in 
assessing their ‘value’ for employees  we decided to remove training days from our TR measure. As employer 
provided  training  intensities  are  quite  low,  we  refer  the  interested  reader  to  Figure  A4  in  the  Appendix  for  a 
comparison across sectors. Interestingly, the incidence of training varies across the life cycle with high training rates 
at young ages in the private sector and at mid career in the public sector. High training intensity among recent 
graduates in the private sector seems to reflect the importance of job specific skills. 
6  For  early  empirical  investigations  of  the  framework  see  Duncan  (1976),  Brown  (1980),  Woodbury  (1983), 
Montgomery, Shaw and Benedict (1992) and Montgomery and Shaw (1997). 6 
earnings, pensions, fringe benefits, work load as well as the risk of unemployment, has direct implications 
for the self-selection of employees across sectors. Third, the Total Reward profiles of the two sectors 
cross for women who are better off in the public sector for most of their lifetime. For men, the private 
sector  offers  higher  rewards  almost  until retirement,  when  lifetime  Total  Rewards in the public and 
private sectors become equalised. This finding suggests some support for the lifecycle version of the 
‘equalizing differences’ story but also raises important questions about how early-career remuneration 
might affect graduates’ sector choice.  
The remainder  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  2  outlines the methodology  of 
evaluating the Total Reward packages in both sectors. An overview of all data sets that will be employed 
and all TR components is provided in section 3. Section 4 presents the results on Total Reward over the 
life cycle. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Defining Total Reward 
Our measure of Total Reward comprises two standard variables, earnings and pensions, as well as 
an array of new components. With regard to pensions we add to the previous literature by accounting in 
great detail for the complexities of the pension system. For instance, we shed light on most components 
of  the  UK  pension  system  simultaneously  (state  pension,  state  earnings-related  pension  and  various 
occupational pensions) and estimate the level of pension wealth from different sources.
7 With respect to 
benefits in kind, we propose simple valuation methods, yet are able to show the importance of fringe 
benefits in the Total Reward package. 
In the valuations of pension entitlements we follow the previous literature (Gustman et al 2000). 
For our purposes we define pensions as the bundle of retirement related payments from different sources 
(general and earnings-related state pension, occupational pensions). Public sector pension schemes are 
generally easier to analyze as they are based on general rules which researchers can collect from publicly 
                                                       
7 We cannot account for more than one occupational pension (however, the fraction of employees holding several 
occupational pensions is small). We also ignore private pensions as we are interested in the level of job-related 
remuneration. 7 
available  reports  (PPI  Pension  Primer,  2008).
8  The  parameters  of  private  occupational  pensions  are 
individual specific and must be retrieved from the data. The asset value of a defined benefit (DB) pension 
is  evaluated  as  the  sum  of  the  discounted  DB  benefit  values  from  retirement  until  death.  For  this 
computation, knowledge about retirement dates and life expectancy levels at retirement is required. The 
actual benefit value will depend on the pension plan details provided by different employers (i.e. accrual 
rates,  accrual  base,  initial  vesting  period,  lump  sum  options,  survivors’  benefits)  as  well  as  specific 
employee details like levels of past earnings and number of years of service. The asset value of the 
earnings-related  state  pension  is  computed  as  the  discounted  sum  of  benefits,  which  are  computed 
according to the formula which was in place during the last years of the State Earnings Related Pension 
Scheme (SERPS). The asset value of a defined contribution (DC) plan is provided by adding up the 
employer and employee contributions which are paid into the plan and applying real interest rates to the 
accumulated fund. The fund is then used, on retirement, to buy an annuity—which will yield a stream of 
earnings  until  death.  Most  group  personal  and  stakeholder  pensions  are  similar  ‘money  purchase’ 
schemes. The distinction between DB (and SERPS) and DC is important: DB and SERPS are practically 
risk  sharing  arrangements  where  the  employer  (or  state)  bears  most  of  the  risk  to  fund  pensions. 
Employees are left with the risk of scheme closure or bankruptcy (for instance like in the Maxwell 
pension scandal).
9 In contrast, the employee bears the entire investment risk of his or her individual 
pension  fund  in  money  purchase  schemes.  In  the  following  analysis  we  ignore  the  difference  in 
‘investment risk’ between schemes.  
The data requirements to calculate the TR level for the average public versus. private sector 
pensioner  are  exacting.  Ideally,  they  would  require  us  to  know  all  of  the  lifetime  earnings  for  the 
individual as well as contribution rate information. We will need to assume that the life cycle earnings 
profile can be approximated by looking at the cross section age earnings profile for the most recent 
cohorts for whom we have data. However it should be understood that this is not the same as a true 
lifetime earnings profile.  
                                                       
8 Public sector pension systems are subject to reforms in recent years, but most of them are only phased in now or in 
the future, so these reforms do not distort our comparison for those who are already members of a scheme today. 
9 The Pension Protection Fund is partially compensating for pension scheme bankruptcy. Since its establishment in 
April  2005,  the  PPF  has  taken  over  177  schemes  with  around  50,000  members  (as  of  August  2010  (see  also 
http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk)). 8 
The total value of a person’s wage payment at time (or age) t (including pension) is: 
          1 −    −    +     
Κ                                                                                          1  
where:    is wage at time t,    is the rate of employee contribution to pension at time t, N is the 
rate  of  National  Insurance  and  other statutory  stoppages  and      is  the  present discounted  value of 
accumulated pension rights at point t.
10 Let the K superscript denote whether a person is in a DB scheme, 
a DC scheme or the State Earnings Related Pension (SERPS) scheme—a brief overview of pension 
schemes is given in Table A1 of the Appendix. We take the perspective of a representative individual in 
each of the sectors and assume for simplicity that the fraction of private and public sector workers in BD, 
DC schemes and SERPS accords to the overall membership fractions in each sector. Hence the average 
Total Reward function for the both sectors is computed as a weighted average of workers in the DB and 
DC schemes as well as SERPS, averaged over the period 1997 to 2009.
11 
Assuming a person is in a DB pension scheme which is based on terminal salary value at time T, 
then the accumulated value of such a pension up to time t,      is: 
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 +  
1
2
   ℓ  
     
    
 +        
     
    
+                  2  
where:    is the person’s year of death
12,13,    is the partner’s year of death,   is the discount 
rate,     is the level of State Pension at time t,   is the cumulated years in the scheme,  ℓ is the loading of 
the scheme and the last term in equation (2) is the lump sum paid in most DB schemes where   is the 
lump sum fraction. As the lump sum payment is tax-free, we recomputed its hypothetical value as if it 
was gross before tax; the applicable income tax rate is 20 percent, as annual pension incomes of our 
typical pensioners fall below the higher rate cut-off at GBP 37,400 (as of 2009/2010). It should be noted 
that the terminal salary is the best out of the previous three years, which is the standard rule in most DB 
                                                       
10 We abstract here from the issue of pension indexation (for a sector comparison, see Pesando, 1984). 
11 Public sector enrollment comprises 90.1% DB, 2.5% DC and 6.3% SERPS, while the corresponding private sector 
numbers are 31.4%, 31.4% and 36.2% (Figures A9 and A10).  
12 We assume that a partner’s pension would start instantly from the time of death of a spouse. 
13 For the time being we assume that there is no difference in the longevity of public or private sector workers. Life 
expectancies are gender-specific cohort values that are up-rated by a premium fraction for social class I and II. We 
intend to investigate this using occupation specific mortality rates in the future. 9 
schemes.
14  The  basic  State  Pension  becomes  payable  in  full  after  30  qualifying  years;  below  this 
threshold, every year pays 1/30
th of the full entitlement.
15 
Now consider the person who pays into a DC scheme. Their accumulated value of their pension at 
year t, will be: 
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                            3  
where:    is the person’s year of death,    is the rate of employee contribution to pension at time 
t,    is the rate of employer contribution to pension at time t,   is the sex specific indexed annuity rate,   
is the discount rate,     is the level of State Pension at time t, r is the number of years from t to T, and x is 
the real annual rate of return on the investment income derived from the DC pension contributions. It is 
assumed that members of a DC scheme take out their contract at age 21 and will buy an annuity at age 60. 
At this age, they are entitled to draw 25 percent of their final transfer value as a tax-free lump sum. The 
remaining three quarters of the fund buy an annuity which is assumed to be the second best open market 
gender-specific  annuity  available  at  the  market.
16  To  reduce  further  complications,  we  assume  that 
members are non-smokers and that all annuities are single-life products in levels without guarantee term. 
The mechanism behind the calculation of the NPV of DC pension income is set out in Table A2 and 
Table A3 in the Appendix for men and women separately. The ratio of the NPV of the pension stream 
over the value of the annuity is very close to 1, but women’s pension stream seems to earn them some 
returns from buying the annuity. This could be due to the fact that we are assuming ‘single’ contracts for 
married women (in order to reduce complexity); pension providers might assume shorter life expectancies 
for single women thus providing them with slightly higher returns. 
                                                       
14 In our computations, this rule applies from age 23. 
15 The number of qualifying years was reduced to 30 on the 6
th April 2010. Earlier, and for persons born before 6 
April 1945 (men) and 6 April 1950 (women), 44 (men) and 39 (women) years were required. 
16 The fund value is rounded to the nearest pound. Annuity rates change over time. The values taken here are as of 
September  2010.  The  annuity  tables  are  taken  from  the  Consumer  Financial  Education  Body 
(http://www.moneymadeclear.org.uk/tables/bespoke/Annuities). 10 
For an employee who has not contracted out of the compulsory state earnings-related pension, we 
value the pension in the following way:
17 
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where     
YT/Yt gives the indexation used for revaluing earnings below the upper earnings limit (UEL) to the 
retirement year (everything in 2009 values). LEL stands for the lower earnings limit which was GBP 
5,044 per year in 2009. The expression in brackets gives the net earnings value that is multiplied by the 
accrual factor χ and summed over all contribution years.  
Due  to  the  complexities  of  the  UK  pension  system  we  have  to  make  some  (non-crucial) 
simplifying assumptions in order to perform our calculations of work related pensions:
18 Both DB and DC 
pension holders are assumed to draw their pension at age 60, while the state pensions (SP and SERPS) 
can be drawn at the normal retirement age of 65 (Banks and Smith, 2006).
19 The pattern of retirement 
ages does not differ significantly across sectors as revealed by a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
distribution test
20—see Figures A11 and A12.
21 Given our focus on the highly educated we assume that 
both  the  public  and  the  private  sector  person  have  the  same  entitlement  to  the  state  pension.  The 
generosity of the pension benefits depends on some measure of personal earnings in DB schemes. The 
accrual fraction is assumed to be 1/60
th in private sector DB schemes and 1/80
th in public sector DB 
                                                       
17 Here, we abstract from the fact that SERPS was introduced only in 1978 and that new entrants to the Second Tier 
State Pension enrolled in the S2P from 2002 on. We set the accrual factor to 0.2 for 69 percent of years and 0.25 for 
the remaining working years in order to reflect the reduction in accrual factors in 1988. We have to make this 
simplification  because  there  is  no  suitable  large  scale  data  source  following  individuals’  pension  membership 
histories over time. We believe the introduction of S2P does not cause any substantial bias as the change from 
SERPS to S2P was meant to support low income earners, while the pension generosity for the highly educated has 
changed only marginally.  
18 We assume away additional personal pension plans or other savings policies. 
19 Everybody is assumed to retire at age 60 and we ignore the possiblity of working at later ages. For evidence on 
working beyond the retirement age in the UK, see Meadows (2006). 
20  The  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  investigates  the  hypothesis  that  the  public  and  private  sector  retirement  age 
distributions are not significantly different. The p-value of the test statistics for the combined test is 0.253 for men 
and 0.231 for women. Also, all one-sided tests cannot reject equality.  
21 In money purchase schemes, there is no official earliest pension draw age, so accruals could theoretically be used 
to buy an annuity at any age. State pension rights are accumulated through the payment of NI contributions and 
pensions become available after a minimum of 30 years with NI contributions. 
) , max(
~
t t t UEL w W =11 
schemes.
22 Public sector DB schemes are assumed to provide 3/80
th lump sum per year of tenure, and the 
private sector DB schemes are assumed not to provide a lump sum payment. All DB schemes and SERPS 
are assumed to have a payment for the surviving spouse of half of the pension entitlement. Survivor’s 
benefits  are  only  valued  for  men,  as  their  spouses  life  statistically  longer.
23  A  comparison  of  our 
parameter assumptions with those made in papers that evaluate pension schemes (Leslie, 2008; Disney et 
al., 2009) is given in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
Now we can add in the other components to Total Reward. Let the person in question work a 
different number of hours per year. If we now assume that the wage rate given above is an hourly wage 
rate then we can write the total pay equation from (1) as: 
              {   1 −    −   } +    
                                                                                       5     
where H is the average total hours worked per year. 
Now adding in the value of benefits in kind, paid holidays and health insurance—denoted    , as 
well as the possibility that the person in question could be made unemployed at any time t, the value of 
Current Total Reward (CTR) is: 
                =     {   1 −    −   } +      +       
Κ                                              6  
where    is the probability of remaining in employment at time t. 
We now finally define what we mean by Total Reward.  We suggest that Total Reward at each 
given age   , should comprise accumulated earnings up to that time plus the accumulated wealth of a 
pension scheme (up to each given age  ), evaluated from the career start (t=21). So we can define the 
Accumulated Lifetime Total Reward (ALTR) in money terms at age   as: 
                  =           {   1 −    −   } +     
 
    
 +           
Κ                  7    
                                                       
22 1/80
th accrual fraction was applicable in the NHS, Teacher and Local Government Pension Schemes before the 
pension reforms in 2007 and 2008 (Steventon, 2008). As the changes applied only to new entrants, our estimates 
reflect the actual situation for most employees quite realistically. 
23 We assume there is no difference between the marriage behaviour or longevity of the spouses in the public and 
private sector. 12 
At this point
24, some caveats of our analysis have to be kept in mind: First, our entire analysis is 
based on a gross evaluation rather than a net of taxes calculation. (Despite the fact that taxes play an 
important role in employers’ decisions which benefits to provide (Rosen, 1986).) We chose to base our 
calculations on gross valuations since all DB final salary calculations use these gross valuations and also 
because in calculating ALTR the tax regime is the same for both public and private sectors. While the 
relevant cost category for an employer is the Total Reward of a worker, the tax preferential treatment of 
many  fringe  benefits  (e.g.,  pensions)  induces  a  trade-off  between  earnings  and  benefits  from  the 
employee’s perspective. Second, a central theme in the literature on compensating differentials concerns 
union membership, a topic that is entirely omitted from our analysis. Unions may have a direct impact on 
pay and working conditions and thus potentially affect the level and composition of Total Reward. Third, 
for data reasons our analysis excludes several numerous groups, like the self-employed—most notably for 
the public sector GPs. The data also exclude the Armed Forces and least earning individuals who do not 
pay any NI contributions.
25 The latter, however, is of little relevance given that we focus our estimation 
on  higher  educated  employees.  In  subsequent research  we  plan to  use these data  to analyse  various 
distinct  occupations  with a  large  enough  sample  to  be  meaningful.  For  the  purpose  of  outlining  the 
concept of TR we focus on the public and private sectors as two large groups. This perspective comes 
closest to the current policy debate. Also note that we use the ONS official definition of the public sector 
which omits certain key groups who are paid from tax income—like university lecturers, FE lecturers and 
teachers in some schools. Fourth, at present we do not evaluate the monetary value of other conditions of 
work like: stress, control over time, autonomy, flexibility, work pressure and other working conditions.   
We make no attempt to control for women’s participation decision across the life cycle. Clearly 
one reason for the marked decline in women’s earnings in the second half of the life cycle in the private 
sector is that many women take time out of the labour market for family reasons. As a result there may be 
depreciation in their human capital and they may suffer loss of career advancement for internal labour 
market reasons. We abstract from these issues by simply focusing on women who are working full time. 
                                                       
24 Note that it would be fairly straightforward to rewrite ALTR in terms of utility – by recasting the calculation in 
terms of financial reward per hour and making some assumption about the trade off between labour and leisure. 
25  Employees  who  do  not  pay  any  NI  contributions  are  not  sampled  in  ASHE.  Beyond  that  threshold,  the 
representativity  of  ASHE  with  respect  to  low-income  earners  has  been  substantially  improved  (Ormerod  and 
Ritchie, 2007). 13 
No provision is made for the fact that higher earnings early in the working life in one sector may 
increase private savings and asset accumulation. While we acknowledge that the timing of remuneration 
over the working life may differ between sectors and thus influence individual wealth, we ignore this fact 
because our principal interest rests on work-related remuneration. We are also implicitly ignoring the 
possibility that state investment (in human capital terms, for instance) is different between public and 
private sectors. 
A final caveat is the treatment of diverse kinds of risks (for a detailed analysis in the pension 
context see Blake, 2006). Attitudes towards risk (risk aversion) and time preferences (discount factor) 
may differ between public and private sector employees.
26 Furthermore, the risk associated with being a 
member of either a DB or a DC scheme (bankruptcy risk, interest risk) may differ. Up to this point we are 
assuming constant discount rates across both sectors and ignoring potential differences in the other risk 
components.   
 
3.  Data 
Data requirements for this research are high: For a careful comparison of Total Reward schemes 
we need four kinds of information: age-earnings profiles, employer and employee pension contributions, 
working conditions (unemployment risk and working hours) as well as detailed knowledge of monetary 
and non-monetary fringe benefits. The analysis will be based on the comparison of highly educated public 
and private sector full time employees aged 21 to 59 years in age-gender-region cells (see the data section 
in the Appendix). 
For the estimation  of  the age-earnings  profiles  we use the  ASHE  data  which  contain  highly 
reliable employer reported earnings information. Earnings of private and public sector employees are 
taken as hourly pay data from the ASHE (1997-2009)—where the bonus pay of private sector employees 
is  included.  As  educational  information  is  missing  in  ASHE,  we  map  the  age  specific  education-
occupation matrix developed by Dolton, Makepeace and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2010) into the data. We 
                                                       
26  For  instance,  deferred  compensation  might  be  used  to  specifically  attract  workers  with  low  discount  rates 
(Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999). 14 
follow Disney et al. (2009) in estimating these profiles net of sector-specific average earnings growth
27 
and in real terms (2009 gross values) using median regressions.  
For consistency reasons, we use employer-reported working hours in our analysis.
28 As a general 
observation, the number of working hours is substantially higher in the private sector. While men work on 
average 38 to 39 hours, their public sector counterparts work on average 35.5 to 37 hours per week, with 
some substantial variation over the life cycle (Figure 2). The overall pattern of working hours profiles of 
women is very similar, with on average one hour less of work. It should be noted that we are considering 
only full-time employees.
29 Employee-reported working hours (available from the LFS) are substantially 
larger, especially for public sector employees, who claim to work on average three (women) to four (men) 
hours more than reported by their employers (see Figure A5 in the Appendix). The overall lifetime 
working time pattern with a reduction in working hours at older ages for public sector employees is 
similar in the LFS and ASHE data. Therefore, the presented Total Reward results are not sensitive to the 
use of the measure of working hours.  
   
                                                       
27 This annual growth ranges from minus 1.94 percent in the private sector in the crisis year 2008/09 to plus 4.84 
percent in the private sector in 2000/01. 
28 A further amendment in the future might be to include unpaid overtime work as part of the cost of working. 
29 The full-time information is reported by the employer and the hours reported in the ASHE data range between 25 
and 99. Observations with working hours above 100 were removed from the sample rather than imputed. This 
procedure led to an exclusion of 0.01 percent of observations. 15 
Figure 2: OLS regression estimation of actual working hours, 1997-2009 
 
Note: Actual working hours are paid working hours as reported by the employer. Hours range from 25 to 100 
(cutoff; no outlier treatment for those reporting more than 100 hours). Source: ASHE 1997 to 2009 (ONS), own 
calculations. 
 
Crucial data for the computation of pension wealth are pension membership, scheme parameters 
(reviewed below), pension contributions and scheme tenure. The ASHE data provides information on 
membership in a range of occupational pensions as well as pension contribution rates paid on behalf of 
the employer and the employee (contribution rates are only available for the years 2005-2009). The 
previous literature has often assumed sector-specific constant rates for pension contributions. We account 
for a substantial difference in pension contribution across sectors and across the life cycle by using 
employer-provided information on employer and employee contributions to different pension schemes in 
both  sectors.  Employers  normally  pay  National  Insurance  Contributions  (NIC)  on  behalf  of  their 
employees. In exchange for these NIC, pension entitlements to the state pension are generated. If an 
employee chooses to join an occupational pension scheme (independently of whether this is a DB or 
money  purchase  scheme),  NIC  can  be  reduced  (contracting-out).  In  a  way,  NIC  are  traded  for 
contributions to the occupational pension scheme. While employer contributions for most occupational 































Public sector, women16 
contributions vary substantially in the private sector.
30 Private sector employer contributions are very low 
at young ages (around 5 percent) and rise up to 14 percent. Employees contribute on average 4 to 6 
percent of their pensionable pay (Figures A6 and A7).  
We do not make any explicit assumptions about job and pension scheme tenure, but assume that 
individuals remain a member of their current scheme throughout their entire active working life. Rather 
than taking tenure membership from the data (in a continuously changing pension system), we prefer 
allowing  for  career  breaks  by  adjusting  age-earnings  profiles  by  the  probability  of  unemployment.
31 
Unemployment risk is derived from the five-quarterly longitudinal LFS files, and is defined as the risk of 
switching from employment to unemployment status (ILO definition) between the first and any of the 
following four quarters. Differences in unemployment risk are important in the valuation of Total Reward 
as spells of unemployment provide no work remuneration and produce gaps in the contribution histories 
to  pension  schemes.  This  said,  it  is  important  to  note  that  unemployment  affects  different  pension 
schemes differently. For instance, an unemployment spell reduces a DC pension through lower overall 
contributions, while it lowers a DB pension through lower earnings and lower scheme tenure. In our 
analysis, we account for these complexities by treating all pension schemes separately. Conventional 
wisdom holds that employment relations in the private sector are less stable compared to the public 
sector.  This  notion  has  also  received  support  from  recent  research  (Cappellari,  2002).  Using  LFS 
longitudinal  data,  Figure  3  further  confirms  this  result.  Unemployment  risk  in  the  private  sector  is 
substantially higher than in the public sector. Also, while the risk of becoming unemployed within the 
consecutive year is—with the exception of the early twenties—stably low in the public sector (around 1 
percent), it is substantial at very young ages (6 to 7 percent) and from 45 years onwards (4 percent) in the 
private sector. 
 
   
                                                       
30 The rate of 6 percent applies for the NHS, Teachers’ and Local Government Pension Schemes. The two smaller 
Police and Fire schemes have a rate of 11 percent, while the Civil Service has 3.5 percent. Between 2006 and 2008 
there were reforms to the contribution rates of new entrants, which are ignored here.  
31 As Disney and Whitehouse (1996) have shown, expected scheme tenure is one of the most important determinants 
for valuing total accruals. 17 
Figure 3: Non-parametric kernel estimation of forward-looking unemployment risk 
 
Note:  Unemployment  risk  is  defined  as  the  probability  of  a  status  change  from  employed  (quarter  1)  to  ILO 
unemployed in the prospective four quarters. Source: Pooled five year longitudinal LFS from 1997:Q1 to 2009:Q1, 
own calculations.  
 
Regarding benefits in kind we evaluate employer provided health insurance by the fraction of 
employees within the private and public sector who report to hold a private health insurance that has been 
paid for by the employer. The ELSA survey collects information on full private health insurance cover, 
e.g. BUPA (not additional dental or friendly health plans), for those aged 50 and above. Since the sample 
sizes are small we first map occupation specific sector affiliations from ASHE into ELSA and then pool 
all observations irrespective  of  age  and  gender (and  ignoring  educational levels). Twelve  percent of 
public  sector  employees  do  have  private  health  insurance  cover,  while  27  percent  of  private  sector 
workers do. Of those who do have private health insurance cover in their own name, 2.3 percent in the 
public sector (N=299) say it is paid for by the employer, while 4.7 percent of private sector workers 
(N=553) do receive a private health insurance from their employer. It seems that the plans for private 
workers are more generous (222.9 GBP as of 2009) than for public workers (141.7 GBP as of 2009). 
Information  on  paid  holidays  is  retrieved  from  the  quarterly  LFS  (2005-2008).  In  addition  to  fixed 
number of public holidays, employers offer a varying number of paid holidays. There are substantial 
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kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = 1.818 
paid holidays, the latter are limited to 20 to 27 holidays. The entitlement of paid holidays increases with 
age in both sectors. Paid holidays are valued at the daily wage rate. 
 
4.  Evaluating Total Reward 
The main challenge of this paper lies in the measurement of Total Reward.
32 In order to make the 
Total Reward package comparable across sectors, we limit our analysis to men and women with higher 
education or a degree. We do this for several reasons. Firstly, because a high fraction of the less well 
educated do not have occupational pensions schemes; secondly, because previous analysis for the less 
well educated shows that such a comparison is relatively uninteresting as public sector wages dominate 
comparable private sector earnings over the whole life cycle and thirdly because this comparison of the 
highly educated is really where most of the media attention has focussed on. 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of Total Reward differences between public and private sector 
 
Note: This profile is for illustration purposes only. Data for men. Lump-sums are re-annuitized in order to reduce 
kinks in the figure. State pensions are payable from age 65. Men die at age 84; between 85 and 87, some pension 
schemes pay survivor benefits. Own calculations. 
 
                                                       
32 We evaluate Total Reward in terms of money and so assume that each person has a utility function which is linear 
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Figure 4 illustrates the general idea of Total Reward. The figure shows real annual remuneration 
for public (dashed) and private sector (solid) males from career start to death. This income measure 
comprises earnings, benefits and pensions. While the two curves start off quite similar at age 21, private 
sector employees soon develop an income advantage of roughly 5,000 GBP per year which persists 
almost up to the age of 50. From age 53 onwards, public sector males are better off, including during their 
retirement age.
33 In order to study which sector rewards its employees better, one has to compare the 
excess areas which are highlighted by two different shadings. Of central interest is the question how much 
present value an individual can generate from employment over the life cycle. We therefore suggest that 
Total Reward at each given age   , should comprises accumulated earnings plus the accumulated wealth 
of a pension scheme (up to each given age  ), evaluated from the career start (t=21).
34 This approach has 
previously been considered for the analysis of career choices (Willis and Rosen, 1979; Dolton, 1990; 
Leslie, 2008). We call the measure which makes entire compensation careers comparable across different 
sectors or occupations Accumulated Lifetime Total Reward (ALTR).
35 We consider ALTR as a sorting 
device into different economic sectors and thus hope to shed light on the incentive mechanism through 
which workers self-select into specific occupations and sectors. The existing literature either focuses on 
earnings potentials and self-selection into specific occupations (e.g. Dolton, 1990) or the public sector as 
a whole (e.g. Disney and Gosling, 1998). The current research attempts to provide a more comprehensive 
evaluation based on Total Reward while analyzing the public and private sectors as a whole. 
Our ultimate goal is to provide an empirical estimate of Total Reward at any given age and to 
compare employees in the public and private sector. The valuation of different Total Reward components 
suggests that private sector workers have lower pension contributions, fewer and less valuable fringe 
benefits and harsher employment risks. Evidence on earnings is rather mixed with an apparent dominance 
of the private sector earnings profile at mid-career and a clear advantage of public sector employees at 
                                                       
33 It should be noted that this does not imply an optimal switching point from the private to the public sector. The 
reason is that a switching employee would most likely not receive the counterfactual earnings. Also, the portability 
of fringe benefits across sectors is probably limited (cp. Mitchell, 1982). We plan to address the question of sector 
switching in our future research. 
34 It is possible to evaluate ALTR at any age. As long as future years are discounted by the same rate as past years 
are uprated, the relative position of the two sectors will remain unaffected; the absolute level of Total Reward will 
obviously change. 
35 While ALTR is a concept that compares the current stock of earnings and pension wealth, it is also possible to 
employ a flow version, in terms of changes in accrual values. This can be informative about the gain from staying in 
employment or in a specific job for another year (on employees’ retirement decisions see, e.g., Disney et al., 2009). 20 
later stages of the working life. Private sector employees, however, work more hours per week implying 
potentially larger annual earnings throughout the entire working life. In order to value the Total Reward 
across sectors at every point in time (age), we add up all components as described earlier.  
The value of benefits in kind as a fraction of annual earnings ranges between 15% in the private 
sector and 20% in the public sector. These shares are relatively stable over the life cycle indicating that 
benefit growth keeps pace with earnings growth. The effect of unemployment on aggregated pension 
wealth is increasing over the life cycle. While it accounts for a fifth of annual earnings at career start, the 
value of accumulated lost pension wealth adds to 80% of the final annual salary shortly before retirement. 
When expressing the public sector Total Reward premium as the difference of public sector ALTR minus 
private sector ALTR in monetary values for men and women (Figure 5), we find that the monetary 
advantage from working in either sector at the career start is very close to the line of equality. This line is 
constructed such that the age specific difference in ALTR between sectors is zero. Up to the mid/late 40s, 
the Total Reward in the private sector is gaining an advantage in the order of magnitude of 60,000 GBP 
for men (10% of ALTR) and 20,000 GBP for women (5% of ALTR). At older ages, the gap is narrowing 
and women reach the point of equalised differences again at age 53 with growing public sector ALTR 
advantage until retirement. The discounted net present value of the public sector premium at age 59 for 
women is substantial—between 30,000 and 40,000 GBP (or 5% of their pre-retirement ALTR). For men, 
the situation is quite different: The large private sector gains are reduced until age 59, where ALTR for 
public and private sector men is exactly equal. Given the public perception of too generous public sector 
remuneration this finding is quite astonishing. Yet, it is in line with estimates across the distribution of 
earnings  which  suggest  that  there  is  a  private  sector  advantage  for  employees  at  the  upper  deciles 
(Blackaby et al., 1999).  
 
   21 
Figure 5: Total reward advantage in the public sector 
   
Note: The profiles are constructed as the difference of public minus private sector Total Reward.    
Source: Total Reward matched cell data set, own calculations. 
 
As no data are available, assumptions were necessarily made about discount factors and real 
interest rates. Our choice of an interest rate of 2 percent has been based on the fact that expectable returns 
from financial market investments were falling over the past twenty years.
36 Other recent UK studies on 
pensions have also assumed such a low interest rate (Crawford et al., 2010). One might argue that older 
employees have enjoyed substantially higher interest rates over much of their working life, so that higher 
interest rates might apply. A rise in the interest rate obviously favours private sector employees more than 
public sector employees as DC schemes are virtually absent in the public sector.
37  
 
   
                                                       
36 Annuity rates have been falling since the 1970s as a consequence of low long term yields and the rise in longevity 
(cp. Cannon and Tonks, 2004). 
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5.  Conclusions 
This paper evaluates the Total Reward of highly educated employees in the public and private 
sector in the UK across the life cycle. It provides for the first time a comprehensive measure of various 
monetary  and non-monetary  work  related  benefits in  addition  to  earnings  and  pension  accruals. The 
analysis suggests that there is not equality of Total Reward profiles between the two sectors at every point 
in time. Yet, the Accumulated Lifetime Total Reward for men is equalised between public and private 
sectors  over  the  life  cycle  suggesting  that  the  private  sector  earnings  advantage  at  younger  ages  is 
counterbalanced by the more generous benefits associated with public sector pension schemes. This result 
implies that male university graduates who choose employment in either of the two sectors based on their 
potential early career reward prospects might get a biased signal with respect to lifetime reward. Women 
seem to be better off in the public sector at almost any point of the life cycle profile. If workers in both 
sectors were exposed to similar levels of workplace disamenities (e.g., stress or mortality risk) our results 
would  imply  a  too  high  compensation  in  the  public  sector  for  women  but  adequate  public  sector 
remuneration  for  highly  educated  men.  We  propose  that  this  confirms  a  concept  of  life  cycle 
compensating differentials and argue that the equalisation of remuneration differentials must be examined 
over the entire working life. Taken together our results imply that it is possible to achieve a ‘lifetime 
equalising difference in Total Reward’ which balances the early career advantage of being in the private 
sector by the long run advantage of being in the public sector later in the career. Indeed this balance 
means that although the ‘spot evaluation’ of Total Reward is almost always different in the public and 
private sector there is a balance and an equalising difference in lifetime Total Reward. 
The  paper  also  stresses  the  importance  of  benefits  in  kind  and  the  role  of  workload  in  the 
valuation in Total Reward. While a substantial literature deals with pensions as part of work-related 
remuneration,  fringe-benefits,  working  hours  and  unemployment  risk  have  not  been  studied 
comprehensively. Our results suggest that these employment aspects are economically important, and 
again more valuable in the public than in the private sector. Such a conclusion means that any discussion 
of  public/private  sector  pay  differentials  or  public/private  sector  pension  differences  is  really 
inappropriate considered in isolation. What should be considered is Total Reward in the two sectors as 
measured over the lifecycle. 
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Data Appendix – Not for publication 
Data sets used: 
We  use  the  maximum  number  of  available  quarterly  LFS  data  and  pool  them  for  obtaining 
measures of the following variables:  
·  Public holiday entitlement: October to December quarters from 2005 to 2008. 
·  For the computation of unemployment rates (ILO definition), we exploit the pooled five-quarterly 
short panels of the LFS from 1997:Q1 to 2009:Q1 (with the exception of 2005:Q3 and 2008:Q4, 
in both of which the information on economic activity status is missing). Unemployment risk is 
defined as the probability to move from dependent employment in quarter one to unemployment 
in one of the subsequent four quarters.  
In order to estimate age-earnings profiles, the most reliable (employer-reported) earnings data are 
in the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), of which we use the years 1997 to 2009. The 
ASHE data have two structural breaks, in 2004 and 2006, two years for which an old and a new data 
version exist. For the computations we used the new version (best compatible with subsequent years) for 
both years. In the years 2007 and 2008 the sample size was reduced by 20 percent, but in 2009, the 
previous sample size of 1 percent of all employees with National Insurance Contributions was restored 
(Summary Quality Report for ASHE: 4). Our earnings measure includes bonus payments.  
In  ASHE,  employers  report  employer  and  employee  pension  contributions  alongside  the 
pensionable pay. From this information, it is straightforward to compute the pension contribution rates on 
behalf of the employer and the employee. Age-earnings profiles are deflated to the base year 2009 and are 
computed after netting out annual average sector growth (cp. Disney et al., 2009).  
To  compute  retirement  ages  by  sectors,  we  pool  all  four  available  waves  from  the  English 
Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA) and the waves G (1997) to Q (2007) from the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS). In the BHPS, public vs. private sector affiliation is reported by the respondents. As 
sector  affiliation  is  missing  in  the  ELSA  data,  we  mapped  sectors  according  to  occupations.  For 
occupations  that  have  more  than  75  percent  public  sector  affiliation  in  ASHE,  we  coded  the  entire 
occupation in ELSA as public, while we coded occupations with more than 75 percent private sector 27 
workers in ASHE as entirely private in ELSA. Occupations that were more equally distributed between 
sectors were omitted from the ELSA sample. 
Similarly, employer-sponsored health insurance plans were retrieved from ELSA. It should be 
noted that these data sample only individuals aged 50 and above. 
 
Sample:  
The target sample for our valuation exercise are full-time employed men and women, aged 21 to 
59 with high education (degree or with higher education below degree but above A-level). The public and 
private sector definition is according to the ONS. 
 
Sensitivity analysis for discount factors δ and real interest rates x: 



















3%  2%  59  0.0%  52  4.3% 
3%  3%  (-)  -0.1%  52  3.8% 
3%  4%  (-)  -1.3%  55  3.0% 
2%  2%  56  2.3%  49  6.9% 
2%  3%  59  1.6%  51  6.2% 
2%  4%  59  0.7%  52  5.3% 
4%  2%  (-)  -1.9%  52  2.6% 
4%  3%  (-)  -2.4%  55  1.9% 
4%  4%  (-)  -2.9%  55  1.3% 
Note: The minus symbol indicates that the public sector ALTR is always below private sector ALTR. Source: Total 
Reward matched cell data set, own calculations. 
 
As we are continuously assuming the same parameters for public and private sector employees, a 
manipulation of the discount rate only affects the relative weight of future pension income in today’s 
Total Reward. A lower discount rate favours the public sector as it gives more relative weight to pensions 
which are more generous in the public sector. Overall, the manipulation of discount and interest rates 
does not change our general findings of roughly equalised ALTR over the life cycle for men and a public 
sector ALTR premium for women.   
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Appendix of Figures and Tables – Not for publication 
 
 
Figure A1: Hourly pay, LFS data, smoothed by local polynomial 
 
Source: LFS, own calculations. 































Public sector: women29 
 
Figure A2: Mean age-earnings profile with 95% confidence interval, men, LFS 
 
Source: LFS, own calculations. 
 
Figure A3: Mean age-earnings profile with 95% confidence interval, women, LFS 
 





























Figure A4: Employer sponsored training days during last 12 months, 2000-2009 
 
Note: Nonparametric kernel estimates. Values relate to previous 12 months. Training days are self-reported in time 
brackets and time brackets were replaced by middle values. Maximal training duration is one year (365) minus 
weekends (104) minus number of public holidays (8) minus paid holiday entitlement in the public and private sector. 
Source: LFS Q1 2000-2009 and Q2 2005-2009, own calculations. 
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Figure A5: Working hours per week, LFS data, smoothed by local polynomial 
 
Source: LFS, own calculations. 
 
For comparison: Working hours per week, ASHE data, smoothed by local polynomial 
[Replication of Figure 2] 
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Figure A6: Company pension contribution rates in the private and public sectors, by gender 
 
Note: Estimates are windsorised at 100% of gross pay. Source: ASHE 2005-2009 (ONS), own calculations. 














































































































Figure A7: Employee pension contribution rates in the private and public sectors, by gender 
 








































































































Public sector, Women34 
 
 
Figure A8: Non-parametric kernel estimation of paid holiday entitlement, 2005-2008 
 
Note: Paid holiday entitlement is measured in days between zero and 96. Around 1 percent of employees in the 
public and private sector report to have zero holiday entitlement. The difference across sectors is insignifcant for 
women, but significantly higher in the private sector for men. Source: Quarterly LFS winter quarter from 2005 to 
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Figure A9: Trend of pension mix in the private sector, by gender 
 
Note: DB stands for Defined Benefit occupational pension schemes, Money purchase comprises Defined Contribution, Stakeholder and Personal Group 
pensions. Source: ASHE 1997-2009 (ONS), own calculations. ASHE only provides information on the main pension scheme (ignoring potential personal 


































1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
DB, Private sector, men
Money puchase, Private sector, men


































1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
DB, Private sector, women
Money puchase, Private sector, women











Figure A10: Trend of pension mix in the public sector, by gender 
 
Note: DB stands for Defined Benefit occupational pension schemes, Money purchase comprises Defined Contribution, Stakeholder and Personal Group 
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Figure A11: Distribution of retirement ages, men, 1997-2007 
 
Note: Pooled BHPS and ELSA data set. ELSA does not contain an indicator for economic sector, so this information 
was mapped into ELSA using an occupational matrix constructed from ASHE. Economic sector was imputed only 
for occupations where more than 75 percent of the workforce work in either the public or the private sector. ELSA 
data will thus underrepresent employees in occupations that are roughly equally distributed across sectors. Source: 
All four waves of ELSA, waves G to Q of BHPS, own calculations. Total sample size: 752. 
 
 
Figure A12: Distribution of retirement ages, women, 1997-2007 
 














































Table A1: Overview of pension schemes 
 
Name  Contractual 
arrangement  Type 
Defined benefit (DB)  Trust based 
Run by the organisation, benefits are determined by the scheme rules, for example based on 
final or average salary 
Defined contribution (DC)  Trust based 
Run by the organisation, benefits are determined by contributions and investment returns, 
also known as money purchase 
Group personal pension  
(for simplicity subsumed under DC)  Contract based 
Facilitated but not run by the organisation, an arrangement made for employees to participate 
in  a  personal  pension  scheme  on  a  grouped  basis.  This  is  not  a  single  scheme,  it  is  a 
collecting agreement 
Stakeholder pension  
(for simplicity subsumed under DC)  Contract based 
Facilitated but not run by the organisation, must meet certain conditions and be registered 
with  The  Pensions  Regulator  (TPR).  Include  employer-sponsored  and  other  stakeholder 
pensions.  Employers  with  5  or  more  employees  generally  have  to  make  a  stakeholder 
pension available to their staff since 8th October 2001 in case they do not offer any of the 
other schemes). 
State Graduated Pension, State Earnings Related 
Pension,  State  Second  Pension   
(all for simplicity assumed as SERPS)  Implicit contract 
The additional state pension was introduced to support the many employees who were not 
covered  by  any  occupational  scheme  and  thus  left  solely  with  the  Basic  State  Pension. 
Through the payment of NI contributions, employees implicitly purchase pension ‘rights’. 


















































21  1428  356.90  1071  4.5  54  410.9  0  356.9  968.5  1325.4  93%  90% 
22  2703  675.64  2027  9  108  783.6  0  675.6  1937.0  2612.7  97%  96% 
23  5326  1331.42  3994  17  204  1535.4  0  1331.4  3658.9  4990.3  94%  92% 
24  8161  2040.20  6121  27  324  2364.2  0  2040.2  5811.1  7851.3  96%  95% 
25  11293  2823.14  8469  37  444  3267.1  20  3528.9  7963.4  11492.3  102%  94% 
26  15016  3754.01  11262  51  612  4366.0  20  4692.5  10976.6  15669.1  104%  97% 
27  18609  4652.22  13957  64  768  5420.2  20  5815.3  13774.5  19589.8  105%  99% 
28  21764  5440.96  16323  75  900  6341.0  20  6801.2  16142.0  22943.2  105%  99% 
29  24362  6090.50  18271  84  1008  7098.5  20  7613.1  18079.0  25692.1  105%  99% 
30  28286  7071.47  21214  98  1176  8247.5  20  8839.3  21092.2  29931.5  106%  99% 
31  32726  8181.38  24544  113  1356  9537.4  20  10226.7  24320.6  34547.3  106%  99% 
32  36595  9148.85  27447  127  1524  10672.8  20  11436.1  27333.8  38769.8  106%  100% 
33  40965  10241.27  30724  142  1704  11945.3  20  12801.6  30562.2  43363.8  106%  99% 
34  45430  11357.45  34072  157  1884  13241.5  20  14196.8  33790.6  47987.4  106%  99% 
35  50175  12543.76  37631  174  2088  14631.8  20  15679.7  37449.4  53129.1  106%  100% 
36  54851  13712.82  41138  190  2280  15992.8  20  17141.0  40893.0  58034.1  106%  99% 




38  64786  16196.48  48589  224  2688  18884.5  20  20245.6  48210.7  68456.3  106%  99% 
39  70109  17527.26  52582  244  2928  20455.3  20  21909.1  52515.3  74424.3  106%  100% 
40  75335  18833.76  56501  262  3144  21977.8  20  23542.2  56389.3  79931.5  106%  100% 
41  80783  20195.75  60587  281  3372  23567.7  20  25244.7  60478.6  85723.3  106%  100% 
42  86548  21637.10  64911  301  3612  25249.1  20  27046.4  64783.2  91829.6  106%  100% 
43  92729  23182.26  69547  323  3876  27058.3  20  28977.8  69518.2  98496.0  106%  100% 
44  99201  24800.14  74400  351  4212  29012.1  20  31000.2  75544.5  106544.7  107%  102% 
45  104630  26157.58  78473  370  4440  30597.6  20  32697.0  79633.8  112330.8  107%  101% 
46  111527  27881.75  83645  395  4740  32621.8  20  34852.2  85014.5  119866.7  107%  102% 
47  117977  29494.28  88483  417  5004  34498.3  20  36867.8  89749.5  126617.3  107%  101% 
48  124769  31192.30  93577  441  5292  36484.3  20  38990.4  94914.9  133905.3  107%  101% 
49  131749  32937.30  98812  466  5592  38529.3  40  54895.5  100295.6  155191.1  118%  102% 
50  138930  34732.60  104198  482  5784  40516.6  40  57887.7  103739.2  161626.8  116%  100% 
51  144747  36186.80  108560  502  6024  42210.8  40  60311.3  108043.7  168355.0  116%  100% 
52  152100  38025.08  114075  527  6324  44349.1  40  63375.1  113424.4  176799.5  116%  99% 
53  159682  39920.45  119761  554  6648  46568.5  40  66534.1  119235.5  185769.6  116%  100% 
54  167645  41911.13  125733  581  6972  48883.1  40  69851.9  125046.6  194898.5  116%  99% 
55  176392  44098.10  132294  612  7344  51442.1  40  73496.8  131718.6  205215.5  116%  100% 
56  184845  46211.25  138634  641  7692  53903.3  40  77018.8  137960.2  214978.9  116%  100% 
57  192784  48196.05  144588  668  8016  56212.1  40  80326.8  143771.3  224098.1  116%  99% 
58  200877  50219.23  150658  696  8352  58571.2  40  83698.7  149797.6  233496.4  116%  99% 
59  209182  52295.60  156887  725  8700  60995.6  40  87159.3  156039.2  243198.5  116%  99% 


















































21  2481  620.36  1861  7.5  90  710.4  0  620.4  1739.4  2359.8  95%  93% 
22  4915  1228.66  3686  15  180  1408.7  0  1228.7  3478.9  4707.5  96%  94% 
23  7840  1959.96  5880  25  300  2260.0  0  1960.0  5798.1  7758.1  99%  99% 
24  10856  2713.91  8142  34  408  3121.9  20  3392.4  7885.4  11277.8  104%  97% 
25  14035  3508.83  10526  46  552  4060.8  20  4386.0  10668.5  15054.6  107%  101% 
26  17258  4314.57  12944  57  684  4998.6  20  5393.2  13219.7  18612.9  108%  102% 
27  20545  5136.35  15409  68  816  5952.3  20  6420.4  15770.9  22191.3  108%  102% 
28  24272  6067.98  18204  80  960  7028.0  20  7585.0  18554.0  26138.9  108%  102% 
29  27477  6869.16  20607  90  1080  7949.2  20  8586.4  20873.2  29459.6  107%  101% 
30  31449  7862.34  23587  103  1236  9098.3  20  9827.9  23888.2  33716.1  107%  101% 
31  35136  8783.90  26352  115  1380  10163.9  20  10979.9  26671.3  37651.2  107%  101% 
32  39186  9796.47  29389  128  1536  11332.5  20  12245.6  29686.3  41931.9  107%  101% 
33  43648  10912.06  32736  143  1716  12628.1  20  13640.1  33165.2  46805.3  107%  101% 
34  48192  12047.98  36144  159  1908  13956.0  20  15060.0  36876.0  51935.9  108%  102% 
35  52666  13166.51  39500  174  2088  15254.5  20  16458.1  40354.8  56813.0  108%  102% 
36  57091  14272.74  42818  188  2256  16528.7  20  17840.9  43601.8  61442.7  108%  102% 




38  66044  16510.88  49533  218  2616  19126.9  20  20638.6  50559.5  71198.1  108%  102% 
39  70482  17620.61  52862  233  2796  20416.6  20  22025.8  54038.4  76064.1  108%  102% 
40  74975  18743.78  56231  248  2976  21719.8  20  23429.7  57517.2  80947.0  108%  102% 
41  79788  19947.10  59841  264  3168  23115.1  20  24933.9  61228.0  86161.9  108%  102% 
42  84747  21186.66  63560  281  3372  24558.7  20  26483.3  65170.8  91654.1  108%  103% 
43  89545  22386.37  67159  297  3564  25950.4  20  27983.0  68881.5  96864.5  108%  103% 
44  94361  23590.34  70771  318  3816  27406.3  20  29487.9  73752.0  103239.9  109%  104% 
45  99648  24912.08  74736  336  4032  28944.1  20  31140.1  77926.6  109066.7  109%  104% 
46  104751  26187.73  78563  353  4236  30423.7  20  32734.7  81869.3  114604.0  109%  104% 
47  109628  27407.00  82221  369  4428  31835.0  20  34258.8  85580.1  119838.8  109%  104% 
48  114929  28732.28  86197  387  4644  33376.3  20  35915.3  89754.7  125670.1  109%  104% 
49  120426  30106.60  90320  406  4872  34978.6  20  37633.3  94161.3  131794.5  109%  104% 
50  126060  31515.08  94545  425  5100  36615.1  20  39393.8  98567.9  137961.7  109%  104% 
51  132133  33033.23  99100  445  5340  38373.2  40  55055.4  103206.3  158261.7  120%  104% 
52  138720  34679.93  104040  465  5580  40259.9  40  57799.9  107844.8  165644.7  119%  104% 
53  145903  36475.85  109428  489  5868  42343.9  40  60793.1  113411.0  174204.1  119%  104% 
54  152023  38005.68  114017  510  6120  44125.7  40  63342.8  118281.4  181624.2  119%  104% 
55  157736  39433.93  118302  529  6348  45781.9  40  65723.2  122688.0  188411.2  119%  104% 
56  164187  41046.68  123140  550  6600  47646.7  40  68411.1  127558.4  195969.5  119%  104% 
57  170715  42678.83  128036  572  6864  49542.8  40  71131.4  132660.7  203792.1  119%  104% 
58  177396  44348.88  133047  595  7140  51488.9  40  73914.8  137995.0  211909.8  119%  104% 
59  184469  46117.35  138352  618  7416  53533.4  40  76862.3  143329.3  220191.5  119%  104% 
Source: Total Reward matched cell data set, own calculations.   43 
 
 
Table A4: Parameter assumptions 
 
Parameter  Disney et al. (2009)  Leslie (2008)  Main specification 
Life expectancy  Age-gender  cohort  life 
expectancies  (1997-
2001);  adjustment  for 
differences  in  life 
expectancies  by  social 
class 
85  (Pension  multiplier 
at age 65 is 20) 
Age-gender  cohort 
life  expectancies 
(2002-2006); 
adjustment  for 
differences  in  life 
expectancies  by 
social class 
Wage growth  NA  0.02  0.02 
Discount rate  0.03  0.04  0.03 
Employee 
contributions 
For final salary plans: 
Private: 4.6% 
Public: 3.9% 
NA  From data 
Discount back to age  NA  18  21 
Real  annual  rate  of 
return 
NA  NA  0.02  
(see Crawford et al., 
2010) 
Accrual factor  Public DB: 1/80
th   
Private DB: 1/60
th 
  Public DB: 1/80
th   
Private DB: 1/60
th    
Additional lump sum  Public DB: 3/80
th 
Private DB: 0 
  Public DB: 3/80
th  
Private DB: 0 
Inflation rate    0.02   
Retirement age  Private: 65 
Public: 60 
65  60;  State  pension 
age (SPA) 65 
Vesting period  2 years (not used)  —  DB: 2 years 
Job Tenure  12.2  (public),  9.5 
(private)  mean 
uncompleted  pension 
plan  tenures  (self-
reported BHPS) 
Life cycle employment 
without  unemployment 
risk (max. 48) 
Life  cycle 
employment 
adjusted  for 
unemployment risk 
 
 